India’s 100 GW Nuclear Dream and the Uranium Challenge

India has set itself an ambitious target of expanding its nuclear power capacity to 100 GW by 2047. Achieving this goal, however, will require a sustained and reliable supply of uranium- something that domestic resources alone cannot currently provide. India’s installed nuclear capacity stands at only 8.4 GW, yet around 70 per cent of its uranium requirements are already met through imports. Ensuring uninterrupted access to imported uranium for the decades ahead is therefore not merely desirable; it is an essential component of India’s long-term nuclear strategy.

This raises an obvious question: why should a country that places such emphasis on Aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) become so dependent on imports for a critical strategic resource?

There are compelling reasons for this. Although India possesses around 4.3 lakh tonnes of domestic uranium reserves, the ore is extremely low-grade, with uranium concentrations ranging from just 0.02 per cent to 0.45 per cent, compared with a global average of around 1–2 per cent. Some Canadian deposits, by contrast, have uranium concentrations as high as 15 per cent. Given these differences in ore quality and the associated costs of extraction and processing, imported uranium can be significantly cheaper than domestically produced fuel. Estimates suggest that the cost of imported uranium may be three to four times lower.

There is another strategic consideration: India needs to preserve its own uranium deposits for future strategic requirements. In this context, securing long-term supplies from reliable international sources is not a retreat from self-reliance but a rational component of energy security.

Until now, India has largely been importing uranium from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Recently, mega import arrangements have also been finalised with Australia and Canada. Australia is particularly significant because of the quality and abundance of its uranium resources- it holds more than 28 per cent of global uranium deposits.

Yet Australia did not always permit uranium exports to India. Despite maintaining normal diplomatic relations with New Delhi, Canberra had long adhered to a policy of not supplying nuclear materials to countries that were not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Even after the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted India a special waiver, Australia remained cautious about supplying uranium, citing concerns about India’s regulatory framework for the civilian use of nuclear material.

To overcome this hurdle, India reformed its old regulatory system and enacted the Shanti Act in December 2025. This legislative move was an important step in creating a framework for the wider participation of private players in the nuclear sector and strengthening safeguards governing the civilian use of nuclear material.

As a logical next step, the government promptly secured a long-term uranium supply arrangement with Australia. The India-Australia Civil Nuclear Administrative Arrangement was finalised on July 9, 2026, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Melbourne. While the total quantity covered by the arrangement has not been specified, the framework is expected to enable Indian entities to source nuclear fuel from Australia as demand emerges.

India has also strengthened its uranium supply relationship with Canada. In July this year, India signed an agreement with Canadian uranium major Cameco for the supply of 10,000 tonnes of uranium. India has maintained nuclear cooperation with Canada since the inception of its nuclear programme. However, following the 1974 nuclear test by the Indira Gandhi government, Canada halted all uranium supplies amidst global sanctions. Its strict anti-nuclear stance against India persisted for over a decade. Cooperation was finally restored in 2015 when the two nations signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and Canada agreed to resume exporting uranium to India for energy generation.

India is also expected to pursue long-term uranium supply arrangements with other major producers, including the United States, Russia and Kazakhstan. This international sourcing strategy, however, does not imply that India is abandoning its domestic uranium resources.

The Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) plans to expand its production capacity and develop new mining and processing infrastructure in states including Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh.

At present, however, the scale of domestic production remains inadequate. UCIL produces roughly 600 tonnes of uranium annually, meeting less than 30 per cent of India’s current civilian requirements. India’s Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) alone are expected to require around 5,400 tonnes of uranium oxide annually in the coming years. Even a doubling of domestic production would therefore leave a substantial gap between supply and demand.

One of the most consequential changes in India’s nuclear energy policy has been the Shanti Act, which opens the sector to greater private participation. Historically, uranium imports and nuclear power generation were largely confined to the public sector. The new Act allows the private sector to generate nuclear power on a large scale- either for commercial sale or captive consumption- and permits them to import uranium directly, subject to the prescribed regulatory framework.

However, private companies will have to use imported uranium strictly under the supervision of the central government’s regulatory body. They will also be required to return the spent fuel for recycling. This entire arrangement of import and utilisation will align with international regulatory mechanisms formulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The growing dependence on imported uranium nevertheless raises another important question: what happens if geopolitical tensions disrupt global nuclear fuel supplies?

Recent disruptions in global energy markets have demonstrated how quickly geopolitical developments can turn into energy-security challenges. The possibility of sanctions, export restrictions or supply-chain disruptions cannot be dismissed in an increasingly fragmented international system.

India therefore needs a carefully calibrated import strategy. Rather than allowing excessive dependence on external suppliers, imports could ideally be capped at around 50 per cent of projected requirements, accompanied by adequate strategic stockpiles. Diversifying suppliers would further reduce the risk associated with dependence on any single country or region.

India has experienced the consequences of supply disruptions in the past. Following international sanctions and restrictions imposed after its nuclear tests of 1998, several Indian nuclear power plants came close to shutdown because of inadequate uranium supplies. The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2005, negotiated by the Manmohan Singh government, ultimately set in motion the process of ending India’s nuclear isolation and restoring access to international nuclear commerce.

In the longer term, however, India’s nuclear security cannot depend indefinitely on imported uranium. The ultimate answer lies in successfully implementing the country’s three-stage nuclear power programme, which was conceived by the father of India’s nuclear programme, Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha, in the 1950s.

The three-stage programme is designed to enable India to exploit its vast thorium resources. India is estimated to possess around 25 per cent of the world’s known thorium reserves. The key to unlocking this resource lies in the successful deployment of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs). Unlike conventional reactors, breeder reactors are capable of producing more fissile material than they consume, thereby creating the fuel required to move eventually towards the third stage of India’s nuclear programme, based on thorium.

India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam successfully achieved its first criticality only recently, on April 6, 2026. This achievement opens the avenue to fully implement the Stage 2 fuel plan. Nonetheless, a massive deployment of FBRs is required before the third phase can be initiated. Scientists estimate this transition can happen only after 2050. Until then, India will remain dependent on imported uranium.